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Passenger railway network protection: A model with
variable post-disruption demand service
Stefano Starita∗ Maria Paola Scaparra†
Abstract
Protecting transportation infrastructures is critical to avoid loss of life and to guard
against economic upheaval. This paper addresses the problem of identifying optimal
protection plans for passenger rail transportation networks, given a limited budget.
We propose a bilevel protection model which extends and refines the model previously
introduced by Scaparra et al. (2015). In our extension, we still measure the impact of
rail disruptions in terms of the amount of unserved passenger demand. However, our
model captures the post-disruption user behaviour in a more accurate way by assuming
that passenger demand for rail services after disruptions varies with the extent of the
travel delays. To solve this complex bi-level model, we develop a simulated annealing
algorithm. The efficiency of the heuristic is tested on a set of randomly generated
instances and compared with the one of a more standard exact decomposition algorithm.
To illustrate how the modelling approach might be used in practice to inform protection
planning decisions, we present a case study based on the London Underground. The
case study also highlights the importance of capturing flow demand adjustments in
response to increased travel time in a mathematical model.
Keywords: Railway networks, disruption, protection, bi-level models, decomposition, sim-
ulated annealing.
1 Introduction
A critical infrastructure, as the name suggests, is a system deemed to be vital to a coun-
try. Several comparable interpretations of the adjective critical have been utilized. The
H.R.3162 Patriot Act (2001), enacted by the U.S. government, states that critical infras-
tructures are “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States
∗Corresponding author. Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, CV4 7AL Coventry, UK, E-
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that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact
on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination
of those matters”. An analogous definition is provided by the EU in the Council Directive
2008/114/EC.
Examples of critical infrastructures include telecommunications, transportation systems
(including rail networks), energy supply chains, banking systems, and water supply networks.
As demonstrated by numerous recent events, natural disasters, terrorism and unintentional
accidents pose serious threats to critical infrastructures. For example, the Fukushima nuclear
disaster in 2011 caused thousands of deaths and led to the evacuation of 300,000 people. Sev-
eral railway stations were completely washed away, railway services were suspended in several
cities and thousands of people were stranded at stations. The interruption of rail services
in Tokyo caused a near-paralysis of the city. Similarly, the London bombings in 2005 killed
56 people and severely disrupted the rail and other transportation and telecommunication
systems in the central area of the city. On a smaller scale, the Philadelphia train derailment
in 2015 killed 8 people, injured hundreds and disrupted train services for several days.
To reduce systems vulnerabilities and mitigate post-disruption losses, protection strategies
are needed. When dealing with rail systems, the protection measures should account for the
assets needing protection and the threats to the infrastructure (e.g., man-made, natural
and accidental threats). For example, in recent years, railways-related copper theft in the
UK has been escalating - causing frequent train delays and an estimated annual cost to
the UK economy of 770m (Milmo, 2011). To head off copper thieves, cables need to be
secured and intrusion detection devices along track sections need to be installed. Other
measures against man-made threats include the installation of Closed Circuit Television
systems (CCTV) and the use of video analysis software to protect critical assets like stations,
bridges and tunnels (Fiumara, 2015). Natural events can also cause severe disruptions to
railway services. For example, the collapse of a sea wall in Devon (UK), due to severe
weather, disrupted the railway to Cornwall and required about 100M for repairs (Robinson,
2014). Structural reinforcements (i.e., barriers and pits to prevent disruptions from flooding
or hardening structures vulnerable to earthquakes) are typical protection measures against
natural events.
Protecting critical infrastructures can involve massive financial investments. Therefore it
is essential to perform a vulnerability analysis and distribute resources in a cost-efficient way.
In this paper, we present a new optimization problem for railway network protection. We
refer to the proposed problem as the Network Protection Problem with Variable Demand
Loss (NPVDL). The aim is to find the optimal allocation of protection resources among
railway assets (stations, tunnels, bridges, flyovers, rail tracks, etc.) so as to minimize the
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impact of worst-case disruptions on the service provision to rail passengers. The disruption
impact is measured in terms of passenger flow (or demand) loss. A key aspect of our model
is that it takes into account the system users behaviour after a disruption. Travel time is one
of the most important factors influencing route choice behaviour (Wang et al., 2014). After a
disruption, increased travel times may cause some passengers to abandon the trip or resort to
other means of transportation, with associated user disutility and system-wide costs. Failure
to capture flow demand adjustments as a response to increased travel time in a mathematical
model may lead to the identification of inaccurate and or suboptimal protection plans. Our
protection model is unique by virtue of its inclusion of flow demand adjustments in response
to increased travel time. Our model also considers the different costs of protection measures
associated with the various assets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of
the literature. Section 3 presents the problem formulation. Section 4 provides a description of
the exact solution approach utilised to evaluate the heuristic accuracy. Section 5 introduces
a simualted annealing heuristic used to solve the problem efficiently. In Section 6, some
computational results compare the performance of the two proposed algorithms. In Section
7, a case study on the central London underground is presented to illustrate the practical
use of the modelling approach. The last section offers conclusions and possible extensions of
the NPVDL model.
2 Background
The problem of optimizing the reliability of critical infrastructure systems against disruptions
has been widely studied from different angles. Broadly, the proposed models can be split
into two major categories: design models and protection models (Snyder et al., 2006). Design
models aim at determining reliable system configurations which work efficiently under normal
circumstances but also in case of disruption. Protection models aim at hardening and securing
systems that are already in place. They identify the set of system components to protect
so as to mitigate the impact of disruptions. A further distinction can be made based upon
the underlying system type: in facility-based systems, only nodes (e.g., warehouses, power
plants, hospitals etc.) are subject to disruption; in network-based systems, both nodes and
links (e.g., roads or rail tracks) can be disrupted.
Design models that incorporate the issue of disruption have received significant attention
in the facility location context. Several works extend popular location models such as the p-
median (Hakimi, 1964, 1965) and the uncapacitated fixed-charge location (UFLP) (Balinski,
1965) to include the concept of system reliability. For instance, Snyder and Daskin (2005)
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propose reliable versions of the classic p-median and UFLP problems, where multiple facilities
can fail independently with a fixed probability and, consequently, unserved demand gener-
ates a penalty cost. These reliability models are further analysed and extended in Berman
et al. (2007), Cui et al. (2010), and O’Hanley et al. (2013). Chen et al. (2011) propose a
non-linear model that incorporates expected inventory and customer costs in the reliable
UFLP. Li and Ouyang (2010) extend the UFLP by adding spatially correlated disruptions.
Peng et al. (2011) introduce a robust optimization model for designing multi-echelon facility
systems subject to failures. Akgun et al. (2015) analyse the location of facilities for preposi-
tioning emergency supplies so as to minimize the risk to which demand points are exposed.
Schmitt et al. (2015) investigate the optimal design of multi-location systems, focusing on
how centralized or decentralized inventory affects the supply chain’s cost under disruptions.
Network design models which include reliability issues have been proposed in a few re-
cent works. For example, Desai and Sen (2010) extend traditional network design models
by incorporating mitigation strategies into the design phase so as to reduce the arcs’ failure
probabilities. Laporte et al. (2010) introduce a game theoretic framework for robust railway
planning. They consider link failures and the presence of a competing transportation mode.
Garc´ıa-Archilla et al. (2013) introduce a simplified version of this model which is computa-
tionally more tractable. A dynamic variation of these robust models is presented by Perea
and Puerto (2013), who also consider the allocation of security resources on the network.
Gong et al. (2014) study the problem of designing a reliable supply chain system, by formu-
lating an interdependent layered network model. Khaled et al. (2015) propose a train design
optimization model for freight railroads which incorporates congestion issues in case of dis-
ruption. Azad et al. (2016) propose a risk management approach based on solving a network
optimization model to ascertain the criticality of each railroad link. This information is then
fed into another model to design a suitable mitigation strategy, including building dis-similar
paths for train services, and installing alternative links around critical service legs.
The vast majority of protection models proposed in the literature use a worst-case scenario
approach. The problems are formulated as multi-level models to emulate the game between
an intelligent attacker and an intelligent defender. These problems can be divided into
two categories: interdiction and fortification problems. Interdiction or attacker-defender
problems are used to identify the assets that, when damaged or removed, reduce a system’s
performance the most. In other words, they are used to assess the criticality of a system’s
components. Conversely, fortification or defender-attacker problems identify the optimal
distribution of limited protective resources so that the system’s value loss, after a worst-case
interdiction, is minimised.
Several protection models have been recently proposed for facility-based systems. Church
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et al. (2004) introduce the interdiction problem for p-median and max-covering problems,
to study the set of facilities that, when lost, have the greatest impact on the transportation
costs or demand coverage, respectively. Aksen et al. (2010) study a variation of the p-
median interdiction problem where the facilities can acquire additional capacity following a
disruption, whereas Losada et al. (2012a) consider uncertainty in the outcomes of disruptive
events. Aksen et al. (2014) integrate partial disruption and demand outsourcing into the
p-median interdiction problem. Church and Scaparra (2007) formulate a bi-level fortification
problem to explicitly model protection efforts. Scaparra and Church (2012) consider the
fortification problem for capacitated facilities. Liberatore et al. (2011) and Zhu et al. (2013)
further extend the fortification model by considering the uncertainty in the number of losses
and protection outcomes, respectively. Losada et al. (2012) study the impact of the recovery
time of disrupted facilities on the selection of protection plans for median-type systems.
Liberatore et al. (2012) propose a tri-level facility protection problem which includes issues
such as correlation of disruptive events and disaster propagation effects.
Within the context of network-based systems, a few interdiction and protection models
have been introduced for distance-based networks. For example, Fulkerson and Harding
(1977) study the effect of partial interdictions on arcs in shortest path networks. Israeli and
Wood (2002) formulate the shortest path interdiction problem as a bi-level model. Bayrak
and Bailey (2008) consider an extension of this model where the players have asymmetric
information about the network. Peeta et al. (2010) propose a fortification model where
highway links can be hardened to reduce the likelihood of failure. Cappanera and Scaparra
(2011) introduce a tri-level model to optimize protection decisions in shortest-path networks.
A line of research strictly related to our work deals with interdiction and fortification of
flow-based networks. The seminal paper on this topic is due to Wollmer (1964), who studies
the problem of removing a subsets of arcs from a max-flow network to identify the critical
components. Wood (1993) proposes a few max-flow interdiction problems, including partial
interdiction, multiple sources and sinks, undirected networks, multiple resources and multiple
commodities. Cormican et al. (1998) consider uncertainty in the interdiction outcomes and
propose a stochastic model that minimizes the expected max-flow. Lim and Smith (2007)
study the interdiction (both partial and complete) of multi-commodity networks. Rad and
Kakhki (2013) introduce a dynamic version of the max-flow problem by assigning a traversal
time to each arc. Jin et al. (2015) study a tri-level fortification model where nodes of a rail
network can be disrupted with multiple intensities. These disruption levels affect the in/out
flow capacity of stations. The authors propose a variable neighbourhood search algorithm
to solve the model and test it on a case-study based on the Singapore rail transit system.
Myung and Kim (2004), Murray et al. (2007), and Matisziw and Murray (2009) study a flow
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interdiction problem on a network with multiple sources and destinations, where the system’s
value is measured in terms of the amount of demand that can still be served after interdiction.
Scaparra et al. (2015) build upon these models to devise a protection optimization model
for railway systems. They embed the aforementioned flow interdiction problem into a bilevel
protection problem and consider both arcs and nodes as possible targets for interdiction and
protection. Starita and Scaparra (2016) propose a dynamic version of this protection model,
where protection resources become available in different time periods.
A practical limitation of previous interdiction models for flow-based networks (Myung
and Kim, 2004, Murray et al., 2007, Matisziw and Murray, 2009) is that the flow between
two nodes is considered lost or unserved only if the two nodes are completely disconnected
after interdiction. Although this assumption simplifies the mathematical representation of the
problems and their solution, it also limits their practical applicability, especially to the context
of transportation networks. In transport systems, in fact, passenger demand between two
nodes may be lost even if a connection does exist but the service is significantly deteriorated.
As an example, if an interdiction causes long delays, travelers may resort to different modes
of transportation or even abandon the trip. Scaparra et al. (2015) and Starita and Scaparra
(2016) make the first attempt at redressing this shortcoming by introducing the concept of
acceptable paths, i.e., paths whose length does not exceed the length of the corresponding
shortest path by more than a given threshold. User demand is considered unserved if, after
a disruption, no acceptable path is available between the origin and destination nodes. The
authors, however, note that their models still present some limitations in that each origin-
destination path is either acceptable or not, and the resulting solutions are highly sensitive
to the path threshold parameter used to define acceptable paths. In their conclusive remarks,
they suggest developing new models which better capture the travelers’ behaviour.
In this paper, we extend the work by Scaparra et al. (2015) and propose a novel bi-
level protection model for railway infrastructures where the post-disruption user behaviour is
modelled in a more accurate and realistic way. We assume that, following a disruption, the
proportion of system users willing to use alternative railway routes depends on the travel time
of the alternative paths (i.e., as the quality of service decreases, so does the demand for that
service). In real applications, this proportion could be estimated by collecting survey data on
a sample of railway network users. The inclusion of the post-disruption user behaviour into
a mathematical model increases the model complexity quite significantly. As a consequence,
the exact methods previously proposed to solve these types of protection-interdiction models
are inadequate to solve the NPVDL. We therefore propose a heuristic approach to find good
approximations to the optimal protection plans.
To summarize, the contribution of this paper is threefold: we incorporate the user be-
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haviour into a protection model for railway infrastructure; we propose an efficient solution
approach based on simulated annealing to tackle the computational complexity of the result-
ing bi-level model; we apply the model to a real-world data driven case study focused on the
Central London Tube.
3 Problem statement and formulation
3.1 Model assumptions
The NPVDL problem is formulated as a bi-level linear mixed integer model. The transporta-
tion network is modelled as a graph G(N,A), where N is the set of nodes (e.g., stations)
and A is the set of arcs (e.g., rail tracks). A limited budget is available for protecting the
network. Interdiction resources are also assumed to be limited. This is a common assump-
tion in interdiction modelling, where interdiction resources are used as a surrogate for the
disruption magnitude. The demand for service between any two nodes is known and entirely
served by the shortest path. If the shortest path becomes unavailable, the amount of flow
loss depends on the length of the alternative routes. A disrupted element is completely un-
usable and, therefore, is removed from the network. An element, once protected, is immune
to any disruption. Both arcs and nodes can be disrupted/protected. We also assume that
the amount of resources needed to protect/disrupt an element is known.
3.2 A bilevel formulation for the NPVDL problem
The bilevel model for NPVDL uses the following notation.
Indices, sets and parameters
s ∈ N : index used for flow sources.
d ∈ N : index used for flow destinations.
i ∈ N : index used for network nodes.
j ∈ A : index used for network arcs.
cj : nominal length of arc j.
fsd : passenger flow between s and d.
Nsd : set of paths that connect s and d.
r, t ∈ Nsd : indexes used for network paths.
A(r) : set of arcs along path r.
N(r) : set of nodes along path r.
αr : percentage of passenger flow using the service when path r is the shortest available path.
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Π(r) = {t ∈ Nsd : length(t) < length(r)}, i.e. set of all paths connecting s to d which are
shorter than path r.
B : protection budget.
P : amount of interdiction resources available.
pni , p
a
j : resource units needed to disrupt node i and arc j, respectively.
qni , q
a
j : resource units needed to protect node i and arc j, respectively.
Decision variables
Xni = 1 if node i is disabled; 0 otherwise.
Xaj = 1 if arc j is disabled; 0 otherwise.
Y ni = 1 if node i is protected; 0 otherwise.
Y aj = 1 if arc j is protected; 0 otherwise.
ωr = 1 if path r is available; 0 otherwise.
Sr = 1 if path r is the shortest non-disrupted path between a given origin and destination;
0 otherwise.
Zsd = percentage of disrupted (or lost or unserved) flow, between s and d.














j ≤ B (2)
Y ni ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ N (3)
Y aj ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ A (4)
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Xni ∀s, d ∈ N, r ∈ Nsd (14)
Xni ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ N (15)
Xaj ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ A (16)
0 ≤ Zsd ≤ 1 ∀s, d ∈ N (17)
Sr ∈ {0, 1} ∀s, d ∈ N, r ∈ Nsd (18)
ωr ∈ {0, 1} ∀s, d ∈ N, r ∈ Nsd (19)
The aim of the defender is to minimize the overall flow loss (1), by distributing protec-
tion resources over the elements of the network. Constraint (2) represents the protection
budget limit. The aim of the attacker is to maximize the flow loss (5), by targeting the
unprotected elements of the network. Constraints (6) and (7) state that nodes and arcs
cannot be disrupted if they are protected. Constraint (8) limits the number of elements that
can be interdicted. Constraints (9) define the percentage amount of flow between s and d
which is lost. This is computed based on the available shortest path between the two nodes.
Constraints (10) state that, for each pair of nodes, there can be at most one shortest path
available. Constraints (11) state that if there is at least one path available between s and
d, there must also be a non-disrupted shortest path connecting the two nodes. Constraints
(12) impose that a path can be the shortest available path only if it is available (i.e., not
disrupted). Constraints (13) ensure that, given an origin-destination pair s and d, a path
r can be the shortest available one connecting the two nodes only if all the paths shorter
than r are unavailable. Constraints (14) state that a path r is disrupted only if at least one
element (node or arc), belonging to that path, is interdicted. Finally, constraints (3)-(4) and
(15)-(19) represent the domain restrictions of the decision variables.
4 SVI decomposition algorithm
To evaluate the performance of the heuristic described in the next section and its ability
to identify optimal solutions, we develop a decomposition algorithm based on the use of
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Super Valid Inequalities (SVI). A SVI is a cutting plane that reduces the feasible region
of a problem by making the incumbent solution and eventually other solutions infeasible.
Although a SVI can remove feasible integer solutions, it is guaranteed not to eliminate all
the optimal solutions, unless an optimal solution has already been found. Examples of SVI-
based decomposition approaches for solving bilevel problems to optimality can be found in
Israeli and Wood (2002), O’Hanley and Church (2011) and Losada et al. (2012).
The decomposition approach, referred to as SVI-D, involves decomposing the NPVDL into
two smaller problems which are solved alternatively: the Relaxed Master Problem (RMP)
and the Sub-Problem (SP). The RMP is simply a feasibility seeking problem, consisting of a
set of SVIs and constraints (2), (3), and (4). At each iteration, the RMP is solved to identify
a feasible protection strategy Yˆ. The Sub-Problem is subsequently solved to obtain the most
disruptive interdiction strategy, Xˆ, in response to protection plan Yˆ. Namely, SP is the lower











s.t. Xni ≤ 1− Yˆ
n
i ∀i ∈ N (21)
Xaj ≤ 1− Yˆ
a
j ∀j ∈ A (22)
(8)− (19)
By solving SP, we obtain a feasible solution (Yˆ , Xˆ) to the NPVDL and an upper bound
to the problem. In addition, the new interdiction plan Xˆ is used to generate an SVI, which is












j ≥ 1 (23)
Inequality (23) simply states that to thwart an interdiction strategy, at least one element
of that strategy must be protected.
The algorithm starts with an empty protection strategy and solves the SPs and the
RMPs alternatively. The iterative process terminates when the RMP becomes infeasible,
i.e., the available protection resources are insufficient to thwart all the interdiction strategies
discovered up to that iteration. Given that protection resources are limited, the algorithm is
guaranteed to converge to an optimal solution in a finite number of iterations.
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5 Heuristic approach
To solve NPVDL efficiently, we propose a heuristic which consists of a greedy-based con-
struction phase, followed by a Simulated Annealing algorithm. The heuristic, referred to as
GSA-H, uses two auxiliary models. The first model, called USER(Xˆ), is the system user
sub-model. It computes the system’s value (i.e., the amount of disrupted flow) associated


















Xˆni ∀s, d ∈ N, r ∈ Nsd (25)
(17)− (19)
The second model, called SP2(Yˆ), is a simplified version of SP (Yˆ). This model assumes
that the flow between two nodes is entirely lost only if all the paths connecting the two nodes
are disrupted. If at least one path is available, independently on its length, all the flow is
preserved. The mathematical formulation of SP2(Yˆ), therefore, no longer requires the path
variables Sr and ωr and all the constraints associated with these variables. Also, the variables


















Xni ∀s, d ∈ N, r ∈ Nsd (27)
Zsd ∈ {0, 1} ∀s, d ∈ N (28)
Constraints (27) state that the flow between an origin s and a destination d is disrupted
only if at least one element on each path connecting s and d is interdicted.
In the following sections, heuristic procedures will be identified by the letter H appended
to the algorithms’ acronyms.
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5.1 Greedy construction phase
In the initial step of the heuristic, we estimate how important each element of the network
is, from the attacker point of view. For the sake of clarity, in this section we will ignore the
difference between nodes and arcs and we will refer to them as network elements, belonging
to the set E. X and Y will represent the interdiction and protection variables, respectively.
Also, the disruption and protection resource vectors pn,pa,qn and qa are merged into two
vectors p and q.
Let i be a vector such that ij = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. Namely, i is an interdiction
strategy where only element i ∈ E is interdicted. The importance ρi of element i is computed
by first solving USER(i) to obtain zuser(i). This value is then weighted by the resources
needed to disrupt i. Formally, ρi = zuser(i)/pi. This parameter is used as an estimate of the
likelihood that element i appears in an interdiction plan and, consequently, in a protection
plan. Let us further define E¯ as the set of disrupted elements in the optimal interdiction
plan, obtained by solving SP (Yg), where Yg is the protection plan built during the greedy
phase.
The pseudo-code of the greedy construction algorithm (GC-H) is given below:
Algorithm 1 GC-H
1: b = 0,Yg ← 0
2: for i = 1 to T do
3: Remove from E all elements e : qe > B − b
4: if E is empty then
5: Solve SP (Yg) and set objg = zsp
6: return Yg, objg
7: else
8: Y ge′ = 1 with e
′ = argmax {ρe : e ∈ E and Y
g
e = 0}
9: b = b+ qe′
10: end if
11: end for
12: while b ≤ B do
13: Solve SP (Y g) for E¯ and set objg = zsp
14: Remove from E¯ all elements e : qe > B − b
15: if E¯ is empty then
16: return Yg, objg
17: else
18: Y ge′ = 1 with e
′ ∈ E¯ : ρe′ ≥ ρe, ∀e ∈ E¯
19: b = b+ qe′
20: end if
21: end while
22: return Yg, objg
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In the first stage of the algorithm (steps 2-11), the protection plan is initialized with the
best T elements with respect to the importance parameter ρ. The exact value of T depends
on the network size and protection budget. This stage does not require solving an SP (Yg)
problem unless the set E of candidate elements is empty. In the following stage (steps 12-21),
SP (Yg) is solved to identify the set E¯ of interdicted components in response to the current
protection plan Yg. From this set, the best element with respect to ρ, which does not violate
the budget constraint, is selected and added to the protection plan. The process is iterated
until no element can be added to the solution without violating the budget constraint.
5.2 Simulated Annealing
After the greedy initial solution is built, a standard Simulated Annealing procedure (Kirk-
patrick, 1984) is used to explore the solution space in the attempt to find improving solutions.
The pseudo-code of this algorithm, referred to as SA-H, is shown below.
Algorithm 2 SA-H
1: objsp = obj
g, objsp2 = obj
g, t = tin
2: Ycur ← Yg,Ynew ← 0,Ybest ← Yg
3: while t > tend do
4: Ynew = Neighbour(Ycur)
5: Solve SP2(Ynew) to obtain zsp2
6: if zsp2 ≤ objsp2 then
7: Solve SP (Ynew) to obtain zsp
8: if zsp < objsp then
9: Ybest ← Ynew, Ycur ← Ynew
10: objsp2 = zsp2, objsp = zsp, t = t ∗ cr
11: else
12: ∆ = (zsp − objsp)/objsp
13: if e−∆/t ≥ rand(0, 1) then





19: return Ybest, objsp
The starting solution of the procedure SA-H is initialized with the greedy solution. At
each iteration, a new solution is generated by exploring the neighbourhood of Ycur through
the routine Neighbour. In order to efficiently evaluate the objective values of new solutions,
we first solve the model SP2, which is significantly easier to solve than SP and may provide
an indication of the quality of the new protection plan. If the new solution to SP2 improves
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the best solution found for SP2 (from the defender perspective), then there are good chances
that the same solution may improve SP as well. Otherwise, the problem SP is not solved
and another solution in the neighbour is generated. This expedient reduces the number of
times that SP is solved and, consequently, the overall computing time of the algorithm. If
the new solution (Ynew) generated by the Neighbour routine improves the best solution,
then both the current and the best solutions are updated (9-10). If the new solution is
not improving, the current solution is still updated to the new one if condition (13) is met
(rand(0, 1) generates a random number between 0 and 1). Every time the current solution is
updated, the temperature t is cooled by a fixed rate cr. The procedure ends as soon as the
temperature drops below a pre-specified value tend.





2: eout is randomly selected from all elements e ∈ E : ρe < ρ
H ∧ Ye = 1
3: Yeout = 0
4: b = b− qeout
5: while b < B do
6: Solve SP2(Y) to obtain E¯
7: Remove from E¯ all elements e : qe > B − b ∨ ρe > ρ
L
8: if E¯ is empty then
9: return Y
10: else
11: ein is randomly selected from E¯
12: Yein = 1




This routine computes a random one-to-many swap move. Only feasible swaps with
respect to the budget constraint are considered. To improve the accuracy of the search phase,
we restrict the set of elements that can be swapped out, by only considering those elements
e with an importance factor less than a given threshold ρH (ρe < ρ
H). Similarly, we use a
parameter ρL to reduce the number of elements that can be swapped in. The specific values of
ρH and ρL will be defined in the next section. Note that the set of candidate elements to enter
the solution is generated by solving SP2(Y). This set (E¯) contains the disrupted elements
in the optimal interdiction plan obtained by solving the simplified interdiction problem.
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6 Results and analysis
In this section, the two solution approaches SVI-D and the Greedy construction followed by
the Simulated Annealing (GSA-H) are tested and compared on some randomly generated
instances.
6.1 Data sets and problem parameters
We evaluate the algorithms’ performances on a set of undirected networks of different size.
We call the networks n-x, where n denotes the number of nodes and x is used to differentiate
networks of same size. We consider three different network sizes: 16, 25 and 36. For each
size, 5 instances are generated. The steps followed to build the instances are highlighted
below:
− n nodes are generated with coordinates drawn randomly in [0, 50]
− Euclidean distances between nodes are used to set the link lengths (cj) and the protec-
tion costs (qaj ).
− Each node can not be directly connected to nodes whose Euclidean distance is larger
than 20. With this logic, a set of candidate connections is built for each node.
− We consider nodes with degree (i.e., number of incident edges) equal to 2, 3 and 4, and
set loose targets on the number of nodes with a given degree. Namely, between 10%
and 30% of nodes must have degree δ = 2, between 40% and 50%, δ = 3, and between
20% and 40%, δ = 4. Links are randomly selected from the candidate connection sets
and added to the network as long as the upper degree targets are not violated. Links
are generated until all the lower degree targets are satisfied. Note that by allowing
flexibility in the percentage of nodes with a given degree, we could always generate
connected networks. On the contrary, by using a fixed distance threshold to limit
possible connections and imposing fixed degree targets, we could not always guarantee
the connectivity of the resulting networks. In addition, the use of soft targets allowed
us to generate instances with different shapes and complexity, thus making the result
analysis more comprehensive.
− The cost paj of disrupting any arc is set to 1. Tracks, in fact, are highly vulnerable
and easy to disrupt because of their length and the presence of accessible and easily
attackable structures (overpasses, bridges, tunnels).
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− Nodes’ degrees are used to categorize stations as small (δ = 2), medium (δ = 3) and big
(δ = 4). This classification is further used to set other problem parameters as shown
in Table 1. For instance, a medium station requires 10 units of resources to be fully
protected and 4 units to be disrupted. The population (pop) of the area surrounding
a station is generated uniformly in the interval [1, 10]. This number is then multiplied
by 10 for medium stations and by 100 for big stations. The resulting number can be
interpreted as thousands of inhabitants.
− The flow matrix is built using a simple gravity model. Formally, fsd = popspopd/e
2
sd,
where ps ( pd ) is the population of node s (node d), and esd is the Euclidean distance
between s and d.
− The disruption budget, P , is initially chosen to be equal to 6. This indicates that a
disruption can disable a big station, 6 different links, or a combination of smaller assets
(e.g., one small station and 4 links).
− The protection budget B is defined as a percentage of the budget T needed to protect
the entire network, i.e. B = QT . We initially consider values of Q equal to 15% and
20%. To guarantee B integrality, we round it to the nearest integer.
δ = 2 δ = 3 δ = 4
Size Small Medium Big
qni 5 10 15
pni 2 4 6
pop U(1, 10) U(1, 10) ∗ 10 U(1, 10) ∗ 100
Table 1: Stations’ parameters.
As in Starita and Scaparra (2016), the set of paths Nsd connecting each pair of nodes s
and d is computed in a preprocessing phase. Namely, for each node pair, the shortest path
is computed by solving an LP formulation of the shortest path problem, and added to the
path set. A constraint is then added to the LP to prevent the generation of that path again.
The problem is then resolved to generate the next shortest path. The procedure is iterated
until the newly generated path r becomes excessively long (i.e., αr is equal to zero).
Finally, the values of the parameters used to model the traveler behaviour, αr, are given
in Table 2. For each origin-destination pair, we use 4 different values which depend on the
shortest path length increase. For instance, if the shortest path r connecting two nodes after
a disruption is less than 20% longer than the shortest path connecting the two nodes before
the disruption, then all the passenger demand is preserved (αr = 1). In contrast, an increase
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of the shortest path length by over 100% (i.e., the new shortest path is more than twice as
long as the initial shortest path) results in the loss of the entire demand (αr = 0).
Length increment ≤ 20% > 20% and ≤ 50% > 50% and ≤ 100% > 100%
αr 1 0.5 0.1 0
Table 2: Values of αr as a function of the shortest path length increase.
6.2 Solution algorithms’ setting
Both the exact and heuristic approaches are implemented using Cplex 12.6 embedded in a
C++ program. Tests were run on a computer with 2.7 GHz i5 6400 quad-core processor
and 8GB of RAM. The SVI-D algorithm uses Cplex default parameters. We enforce a time
limit of 10, 000 seconds for its execution. The values of the parameters used by GSA-H were
chosen empirically after some preliminary tests. Their setting is as follows:
− tin = 100.
− tend = 0.01.
− cr = 0.93.
− ρH is the T th highest value of ρ.
− ρL is chosen such that |EL| = |E|/4, where EL =
{




The values of T , shown in Table 3, were chosen empirically. These values depend on the
network size and the protection budget. For example, for the 25-x networks and with a 15%
budget, Yg is initialized with the first 3 best elements.
Network name
Q 16-x 25-x 36-x
15% 2 3 8
20% 4 6 14
Table 3: Values of T for each combination of network size and protection budget values.
6.3 Performance comparison
In Table 4 and Table 5 we compare the performance of SVI-D and GSA-H for two protection
budget levels: 15% and 20%, respectively. For both algorithms, the tables list the objective
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values and the computing times. The gap column shows the percentage error of the GSA-H
solutions compared with the SVI-D solutions. For the heuristic approach, we also show the
execution time of the algorithm.
SVI-D GSA-H
Network Number Objective Computing Objective Objective Gap Gap Computing
name of arcs value time(s) value (AVG) value(Best) (AVG) (Best) time(s) (AVG)
16-1 19 10798.5 1.5 10799.7 10798.5 0.0% 0.0% 1.4
16-2 21 125426.0 4.9 125960.0 125960.0 0.4% 0.4% 2.9
16-3 22 103072.0 2.3 103666.1 103072.0 0.6% 0.0% 4.1
16-4 24 976164.0 1.2 976164.0 976164.0 0.0% 0.0% 3.6
16-5 22 82266.5 5.1 82266.5 82266.5 0.0% 0.0% 4.6
25-1 36 91479.6 9.5 91479.6 91479.6 0.0% 0.0% 7.2
25-2 43 8514070.0 48.1 8514070.0 8514070.0 0.0% 0.0% 25.3
25-3 39 912132.0 115.2 912132.0 912132.0 0.0% 0.0% 59.5
25-4 42 2620880.0 144.8 2644080.0 2644080.0 0.9% 0.9% 34.6
25-5 37 879881.0 60.0 879881.0 879881.0 0.0% 0.0% 15.2
36-1 61 6200620.0 1152.1 6200620.0 6200620.0 0.0% 0.0% 138.9
36-2 62 7192520.0◦ 10000 7192520.0 7192520.0 0.0% 0.0% 182.2
36-3 62 5085400.0◦ 10000 4858400.0 4772240.0 -4.5% -6.2% 288.8
36-4 58 3787020.0 8091.4 3880475.0 3791880.0 2.5% 0.1% 196.2
36-5 60 3941680.0◦ 10000 3847340.0 3847340.0 -2.4% -2.4% 228.2
AVG 2701560.6 2642.4 2687990.3 2676300.2 0.3%† 0.1%† 79.5
◦Objective value obtained after 10,000 sec.
†The average is computed excluding the cases where the gaps are negative.
Table 4: Computational results (Q = 15% and P = 6)
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SVI-D GSA-H
Network Number Objective Computing Objective Objective Gap Gap Computing
name of arcs value time(s) value (AVG) value(Best) (AVG) (Best) time(s) (AVG)
16-1 19 9256.7 3.0 9261.4 9256.7 0.1% 0.0% 1.6
16-2 21 67021.8 7.2 67021.8 67021.8 0.0% 0.0% 2.1
16-3 22 86701.4 4.3 86701.4 86701.4 0.0% 0.0% 5.7
16-4 24 430400.0 2.6 432855.8 430400.0 0.6% 0.0% 2.6
16-5 22 72928.5 7.4 72928.5 72928.5 0.0% 0.0% 4.2
25-1 36 74847.7 23.9 75364.6 74847.7 0.7% 0.0% 6.5
25-2 43 6206390.0 170.5 6206390.0 6206390.0 0.0% 0.0% 26.9
25-3 39 725125.0 224.3 725125.0 725125.0 0.0% 0.0% 59.0
25-4 42 2029260.0 270.7 2029260.0 2029260.0 0.0% 0.0% 32.6
25-5 37 553016.0 190.9 553016.0 553016.0 0.0% 0.0% 14.7
36-1 61 5758590.0 1876.8 5758590.0 5758590.0 0.0% 0.0% 152.8
36-2 62 6035350.0◦ 10000 5282835.0 5221890.0 -12.5% -13.5% 152.9
36-3 62 4814590.0◦ 10000 3714470.0 3714470.0 -22.8% -22.8% 349.2
36-4 58 3391630.0◦ 10000 3188382.5 2937520.0 -6.0% -13.4% 168.1
36-5 60 3719340.0◦ 10000 3179980.0 3179980.0 -14.5% -14.5% 236.6
AVG 2264963.1 2852.1 2092145.5 2071159.8 0.1%† 0.0%† 81.0
◦Objective value obtained after 10,000 sec.
†The average is computed excluding the cases where the gaps are negative.
Table 5: Computational results (Q = 20% and P = 6)
The analysis of the tables shows that SVI-D is able to solve to optimality only small and
medium problem instances. Within the time allowed, the algorithm does not converge in 7
out of the 10 large instances (networks 36-x). For these instances, the solutions found by the
heuristic in a fraction of the time are always superior (in a case more than 20% better). GSA-
H is able to identify 9 out of the 12 proven optimal solutions for Q = 15%, and all the proven
optimal solutions for Q = 20%. Unlike the exact method, the execution time and the solution
quality of the heuristic are not affected by the budget amount. In addition, the quality of
the solutions is fairly good across all the iterations, with an iteration average gap (excluding
negative gaps) equal to 0.3% when Q = 15% and 0.1% when Q = 20%. The efficiency of
GSA-H in solving these problems is largely due to the use of the auxiliary problem SP2.
Solving this problem, in fact, is computationally much easier than solving SP (80% faster
on average). The solutions obtained by solving SP2 are often good approximations of the
solutions to SP, although there are cases where the objectives of the two problems’ optimal
solutions differ by as much as 32%.
Overall, GSA-H seems to be both accurate and scalable. In the next section, we will show
that this heuristic algorithm can be successfully used to identify cost-efficient protection plans
for an even larger, real-size network.
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7 Case study
In this section, we present a case study on the Central London Tube. Some of the find-
ings emerging from the case study’s analysis are then validated using the random instances
presented in the previous section.
The map of the central portion of the London Tube is displayed in Fig. 1. The corre-
sponding network is made of 51 nodes and 70 undirected arcs.
Figure 1: Central London tube map
To set the parameters of the problem, we use the open data available on the Transport For
London website (TFL) (www.tfl.gov.uk/info-for/open-data-users). We use the running time
between two directly connected stations to set the nominal cost of each arc, which is then
used for computing the paths’ length. The length of each path includes a 10-minute delay for
each line change along the path. The physical distance of a connection is used to estimate its
protection cost. This choice is motivated by the fact that typical protection strategies, such
as digging draining pits, fortifying water pipes and sewers, and installing video surveillance,
are all dependent on the length of the link. TFL also provides information regarding the
flow from all the origins to all the destinations. This is used to build the demand matrix.
We categorize the stations into three groups based on their sizes: small (pni = 2), medium
(pni = 4) and big (p
n
i = 6). The annual flow of passengers is used to identify the category of
each station. Namely, a station is small if the amount of annual passengers going through
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it is less than 25 millions, medium if it is between 25 and 50 millions, big otherwise. The
rest of the parameters are set as explained in the previous section. We analyse different
scenarios which vary in terms of protection budget (0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%) and amount of
disruption resources (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). Algorithm GSA-H is used to solve the problem, if not
stated otherwise.
7.1 Impact of the protection budget on the flow loss
The impact of different protection budget levels on the system worst-case flow loss is displayed
in Fig. 2. The analysis is performed for six scenarios, which differ in terms of the disruption
magnitude, defined by the parameter P .
Figure 2: Flow loss for different budget levels and disruption scenarios (London Tube)
Clearly, increasing the protection resources from 0% to 20% can reduce the worst-case
flow loss quite significantly, in every disruption scenario. For the largest disruption scenario
(P = 6), the flow loss drops from more than 56% to about 34%. This means that, without
any protection, a large disruption can potentially affect more than half of the entire traffic
on the network. If 20% of the network is protected in a cost-efficient way, then the worst-
case scenario flow loss drops to about one third of the total flow. Generally, all the budget
increments prove to have a beneficial impact on the demand losses, although the marginal
benefit due to the last increment decreases for small disruption scenarios (i.e., P = 1).
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Table 6: Flow loss with no protection and with 20% protection for P = 6 (Random instances)
The impact of protection is even more pronounced when the random instances are con-
sidered. For each random instance, Table 6 displays the demand loss when the network is
completely unprotected and when 20% of the network is protected, for P = 6. The results
highlight that these networks, especially the small ones, are highly vulnerable to disruptions:
up to 95% of the flow (76% on average) can be disrupted without protection when only a
few assets are disabled. However, a cost efficient protection plan can significantly mitigate
the impact of disruption, reducing the flow loss to 23% on average.
7.2 Protection plans analysis
In this section, we analyse the Tube protection plans identified by the model in different
scenarios. We consider the same six disruption scenarios used in the previous section and
four protection budget levels (5%, 10%, 15%, 20%). Tables 7 and 8 show the most frequently
protected nodes and links of the network across the 24 scenarios.
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Table 7: Frequency of protections for stations
Link No. of protections
Holborn-Tottenham Court Road 24
Chancery Lane-St. Pauls’s 24
Bank/Monument-St. Pauls’s 24
Bond Street-Mable Arch 23
Chancery Lane-Holborn 23
Oxford Circus-Tottenham Court Road 21
Lancaster Gate-Marble Arch 19
Bond Street-Oxford Circus 19
Notting Hill-Queensway 18
Queensway-Lancaster Gate 18
Table 8: Frequency of protections for links
Table 8 shows that some key links (the first three) appear in every single protection plan.
This is a clear evidence of how critical these assets are for the network: independently on
the disruption scenario and available protection resources, these links must be protected to
minimize the system’s losses in case of disruption. Among the stations, Westminster and
Notting Hill are clearly the most critical: they are protected in 18 and 16 out of the 24 cases,
respectively (Table 7).
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Figure 3: Most frequently protected elements
In Fig. 3 the most frequently protected elements of the network are highlighted. Circles,
triangles and squares represent small, medium and big stations, respectively. The figure
shows a clear pattern in the protection. All the protected arcs and most of the protected
nodes belong to the Central line. This is a plausible result, considering that the Central line
is the busiest tube line, with over 260 million annual passengers.
7.3 The importance of considering variable post-disruption de-
mand
To prove the importance of modeling the passenger (user) behaviour in an accurate way when
planning protection efforts, we propose a comparison between the solutions obtained with
NPVDL and the solutions obtained with the model introduced by Scaparra et al. (2015).
We refer to this model as the Network Protection Problem with Constant Demand Loss
(NPCDL). Although NPCDL and NPVDL use the same metric to evaluate the impact of a
disruption (i.e., the demand loss), the passenger behaviour in NPCDL is modeled in a much
more simplistic way by simply discarding, in a pre-computational step, paths that exceeds a
given threshold. In the following analysis, we firstly focus on the London Tube. We consider
two threshold values to define the acceptable paths: 2 (meaning that a path twice as long as
the shortest path or less is considered acceptable) and 1.5 (meaning that a path up to 50%
longer than the shortest path is considered acceptable).
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(a) P = 2, Q = 5% (b) P = 2, Q = 5%
(c) P = 4, Q = 5% (d) P = 4, Q = 5%
(e) P = 6, Q = 5% (f) P = 6, Q = 5%
Figure 4: Optimal protection plans and post-protection interdictions for NPVDL and NPCDL
(London Tube)
In Fig. 4, we display the optimal protection plans and the post-protection, worst-case
interdictions identified by the two models (NPVDL and NPCDL with threshold 2) for three
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different disruption scenarios (P = 2, 4, 6). The optimal solutions were computed by using
SVI-D for both problems. For the sake of clarity, this figure displays the results for a pro-
tection budget level equal to 5% (protection plans involving fewer elements can be better
visualized in the pictures). The pictures in the left column (4a, 4c, 4e) show the NPVDL
solutions, whereas the pictures in the right column (4b, 4d, 4f) show the NPCDL solutions.
It is evident that the solutions identified by the two models differ quite significantly, both
in terms of protected elements and in terms of post-protection, worst-case disruptions. For
example, when P = 2 and P = 4 the protection plans are completely different. Substantial
differences were also noted for other values of the parameter Q.
To evaluate the impact that overlooking the user behaviour may have on the evaluation
of worst-case demand losses, we use the optimal protection plans identified by NPCDL to
compute the worst-case losses in our modelling framework (i.e., when the post-disruption
passenger demand varies with the extent of the travel delay according to the pattern of αr
values in Table 2). Note that for budgets larger than 5%, the problems were solved with
GSA-H. As noted in the previous section, in fact, the performance of SVI-D deteriorates
when the budget increases and the instances with a budget exceeding 5% could not be solved
by the exact approach. Table 9 displays the percentage objective function (demand loss)
increase for different disruption scenarios and protection budget levels, when the threshold
is equal to 2 and 1.5, respectively.
By observing the table, it can be noticed that the solutions found by NPCDL are strongly
suboptimal, especially for large values of Q and small disruptions. In this case study, the
demand loss increase for both threshold values can be as high as 153% when Q = 20% and
P = 1. Although the increase is less substantial for other combinations of the parameters
P and Q, in all cases but two, solving the more simplistic NPCDL model results in a mises-
timation of the real worst-case scenario losses in case of disruption. Note that the negative
increase in Table 9, observed when P = 3, Q = 5% and threshold is 1.5, is due to the fact




P 5% 10% 15% 20% 5% 10% 15% 20%
1 16% 57% 129% 153% 16% 59% 139% 153%
2 12% 12% 58% 71% 11% 10% 49% 85%
3 14% 19% 38% 56% −1% 16% 48% 99%
4 11% 19% 32% 51% 1% 15% 30% 24%
5 6% 12% 3% 8% 4% 2% 21% 8%
6 4% 9% 7% 16% 0% 5% 11% 16%
AVG 11% 21% 45% 59% 5% 18% 50% 64%
Table 9: Demand loss increase when using NPCDL with threshold 2 and 1.5 (London Tube)
This finding is corroborated by performing the same analysis on the random instances.
Average results over the 15 random instances are displayed in Table 10. Even for these
instances, worse-case scenario losses can be significantly under-estimated when using NPCDL.
Threshold=2 Threshold=1.5
Q
P 5% 10% 15% 20% 5% 10% 15% 20%
1 28% 80% 214% 345% 21% 31% 113% 229%
2 59% 161% 289% 631% 46% 142% 254% 564%
3 57% 172% 303% 72% 3% 8% 26% 367%
4 7% 19% 28% 181% 2% 7% 18% 143%
5 21% 61% 19% 155% 17% 53% 10% 15%
6 2% 39% 12% 77% 0% 1% 3% 44%
AVG 29% 89% 144% 244% 15% 40% 71% 227%
Table 10: Average demand loss increase when using NPCDL with threshold 2 and 1.5 (Random
instances)
These results show empirically that failure to accurately represent the passenger be-
haviour into a modeling framework may lead to highly sub-optimal protection strategies,
where limited protection resources are not allocated in a cost-effective way.
7.4 Solution analysis with a less delay-sensitive passenger behaviour
In the previous section, we have demonstrated that considering the passenger behaviour is
crucial to identify sound protection strategies. In this section, we analyse the sensitivity of
our solutions to different values of the parameter αr, used to capture the passenger behaviour.
To this end, we run a new set of experiments where the values of αr have been changed to
the values shown in Tab. 11.
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Length increment ≤ 40% > 40% and ≤ 70% > 70% and ≤ 100% > 100%
αr 1 0.5 0.1 0
Table 11: New values of α as a function of the shortest path increase.
These values indicate that passengers are willing to accept longer travel delays, as com-
pared to the ones used in the previous analysis. For instance, a travel time increase up to
40% does not cause any flow loss, whereas previously a 40% increment would have led to the
loss of 50% of the flow.
Tables 12 and 13 show the most frequently protected stations and links, across all the
proposed scenarios.











Table 12: Frequency of protections for stations, with new α values.
Link No. of protections
Bond Street-Mable Arch 24
Chancery Lane-Holborn 24
Chancery Lane-St. Pauls’s 22
Holborn-Tottenham Court Road 22
Bank/Monument-St. Pauls’s 20
Lancaster Gate-Marble Arch 20
Oxford Circus-Tottenham Court Road 18
Notting Hill-Queensway 18
Queensway-Lancaster Gate 18
Bond Street-Oxford Circus 14
Table 13: Frequency of protections for links, with new α values.
Changing α has an obvious impact on the objective function. There is, in fact, an average
4.4% decrease in the flow loss. Nonetheless, it seems that the protection plans have not
changed significantly. Tables 12 and 13 show the same patterns highlighted by Tables 7 and
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8. No new element appears in the protection plans and there are only small variations in the
frequency of the protected elements. This suggests that, for this particular case, the solutions
identified by our model are quite robust to variations of the parameter α. As mentioned in
the introduction, estimates of this parameter can be obtained by surveying a sample of the
railway system users. A small misestimation of this figure should not have a major impact
on the protection strategies identified by the model.
8 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we introduce a new modelling approach for increasing the reliability and security
of flow-based networks. Our focus is on passenger railway systems. The proposed approach
overcomes some of the limitations of pre-existing models, by capturing the user behaviour in
a post-disruption period. Specifically, our model assumes that the demand for service after
a disruption depends upon the extent of travel delay of each origin-destination route on the
network. Results show that failing to consider the user behaviour may lead to sub-optimal
protection plans and an underestimation of disruption consequences.
The inclusion of the post-disruption user behaviour into a mathematical model signifi-
cantly increases the model complexity and tractability. To identify optimal or near-optimal
solutions to the problem, we developed a heuristic solution approach consisting of a greedy
construction phase followed by a Simulated Annealing procedure. We also implemented an
exact decomposition algorithm based on the concept of Super-Valid Inequalities. Compu-
tational tests on some randomly generated networks show that the exact method, although
useful to assess the accuracy of the heuristic on small problems, can only tackle networks of
modest size. In contrast, the heuristic proves to be both efficient and effective in identifying
high quality solutions. The application of the modelling approach to a real rail network (the
London tube) provides a practical demonstration of how limited protection resources can be
allocated in a cost-efficient way among the most vulnerable assets of a rail system. It also
highlights how some key elements must be protected in every disruption scenario to achieve
high level of network security. Finally, the case study highlights the fact that neglecting the
post-disruption user behaviour may lead to the identification of highly inefficient protection
strategies, with worst-case disruption losses 150% higher than those obtained with our model.
Interesting extensions to this work include the introduction of some stochastic elements
in the modelling approach so as to allow relaxation of the assumption that interdictions and
protections are always successful. Furthermore, our model assumes that the attacker has
perfect knowledge of the infrastructure. Stochastic models could also be used to relax this
assumption. New models could also be developed to protect infrastructure systems against
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both man-made and natural disasters. In the latter case, scenario-indexed models may
be more suitable to capture the randomness and likelihood of disruptive events. Another
interesting line of research for the future would be the development of similar models for
optimising the protection of road networks in addition to rail networks. This would require
taking into consideration complex issues such as traffic equilibrium, link congestion and
the user imperfect perception of the state of the network (He and Liu, 2012). Extending
our model to capture these additional aspects would undoubtedly make the problem more
difficult to solve. Therefore, future research should also be directed towards developing some
novel and efficient solution approaches.
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